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A price discrimination model is proposed to explain extraneous information provided by internet 
sales sites for agricultural inputs. Whether an informative site is offered depends on price 
discrimination potential, which depends on how much farmers reveal heterogeneity by internet 
behavior. Price discrimination is greater if information benefits are negatively correlated with 
farm-size, explaining why extraneous (not product-related) information is offered on internet 
sales sights. Price discrimination adversely affects some farmers but may be beneficial on 
average because it generates free information. Outcomes depend on whether internet users are 
aware of price differentials generated by the reverse flow of clickstream information.  
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Since 1997, use of the internet in agriculture has accelerated rapidly (Wolf, Just, Wu, and 
Zilberman; Just and Just), although greater use has occurred by agribusiness and larger farms 
than small farms. Several websites now offer on-line sales of agricultural inputs ranging from 
fertilizer to large equipment. As more agricultural transactions take place on the internet, 
understanding is needed about the distributional effects of the internet. 
 Many have focused on the benefits of the internet including the broad range of general 
information freely available at internet marketing sites. We call this extraneous information, 
differentiating it from information directly related to promotion and use of products offered for 
sale. But the internet also generates a reverse flow of information from registration data and 
clickstream choices of users that can be used for third-degree price discrimination or targeted 
direct marketing (Just and Just). We call this personal information. 
 The reason internet sites to provide extraneous information is obscure because providing 
it is presumably costly but seemingly gains no benefit for the input supplier if users can surf the 
web, collect information, and then buy elsewhere at the lowest price. Initially, many agricultural 
internet sites provided an inexplicable array of extraneous information. Then many successful 
internet sites were purchased by major agricultural marketing firms or merged with other sites 
allowing an unprecedented sharing of farmers’ personal information. As a result, the potential 
use of market power by agricultural suppliers remaining in the virtual world has increased. While 
market power is partially limited by off-line supplier competition, patent-protected monopolies 
exist for many inputs. Personal information permits price discrimination because the firm can 
offer different internet choices, including different email offers, and different prices depending 
on a farmer’s clickstream choices. More recently, the provision of extraneous information for 
agriculture has been specialized in sites that provide links to numerous marketing sites, such as 
AgWeb.com, Agriculture.com, or DirectAg.com. Although the structure is different, these sites 
retain the right to pass clickstream information to agricultural marketers as their links are 
selected (see the privacy policies), thus enabling the same use of personal information while 
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achieving economies of providing information. 
 This article explores the related implications for agriculture of information exchange via 
the internet. While some means of distinguishing customer traits may exist for storefront sales 
(such as face-to-face negotiation), these methods tend to be costly to implement, require skilled 
salesmen rather than automated software, and generate data that is hard to record or recall as 
needed. Alternatively, the majority of inputs sold in storefronts are sold at a single posted 
(though possibly non-linear) price, as assumed herein. The next section discusses the internet as 
a two-way information exchange focusing on the capabilities of internet site providers to infer 
preferences from individual choices, and on individuals’ abilities to protect themselves from 
monitoring. Building on Maskin and Riley, a model is proposed where firms bundle extraneous 
information with products. For sharp results, price discrimination is considered only where one 
price is offered on the internet and another is offered in storefronts. The input supplier sets prices 
to maximize profit given internet choices of farmers where the benefits of extraneous 
information depend on farmsize and willingness to pay (WTP) for the product. Such third-degree 
price discrimination can, in some cases, increase welfare because some farmers receive lower 
prices and others receive free information without buying. However, both competition (which 
limits price discrimination) and free access to information can limit suppliers’ abilities to recoup 
the cost of providing information, while lack of competition can lead to excessive price 
discrimination through use of personal information. Thus, market failures can occur where 
agricultural suppliers either under- (or over-) supply extraneous information compared to the 
social optimum. 
The Internet as an Information Exchange 
The internet differs from other forms of sales not only by distance and speed but because 
personal information transmitted by farmers can be used cheaply by internet site providers. 
Because information can be both sent and received, suppliers can bait farmers with links to 
extraneous information in order to classify them. While brick and mortar storefronts can also 
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offer extraneous information, they cannot offer the same convenience or flexibility. Rather, 
storefronts tend to offer only information related to the product offered for sale, while internet 
marketing sites typically offer extraneous information not directly related to the product, such as 
crop news, scouting reports, or weather information. Furthermore, farmers can access updated 
information instantaneously on the internet without leaving their farms. Such behavior can be 
used to target advertising and price offers based on internet choices. 
 Shapiro and Varian have demonstrated in a nonagricultural context how personal 
clickstream information enables price discrimination. While privacy software has been 
developed, it is detectable by internet site providers, which in itself facilitates discrimination 
because it limits access to both extraneous information and transactions. Moreover, the analysis 
of massive internet customer data sets has motivated a new field of study called data mining.  
 While many studies focus on the potential for product customization and reduced search 
costs, the marketing literature has focused on internet price discrimination using personal 
information (see the review by Koch and Cebula). Daripa and Kapur find that the internet 
encourages market concentration and that third-degree price discrimination is rampant on the 
internet. Findings refute the idea that abundant price and quality information on the internet leads 
to rapid price discovery. Brynjolfsson and Smith find that price dispersion is greater on the 
internet and that firms change prices more often on the internet. They find as much as 33 percent 
differences in prices and that one firm with a 60 percent market share charged 10 percent more 
than other internet marketers for identical products. Bakos finds that prices diverge rather than 
converge on the internet and gives evidence that this is due to tailoring prices to individuals. 
Streitfeld documents price setting based on personal information including behavior by zip code 
and employer (based on IP addresses). 
 With growing evidence on internet price discrimination, the potential effects of internet 
marketing on agriculture deserve consideration. Because of the highly heterogeneous nature of 
farming (e.g., farmsize, location, and product mix), extraneous information choices may make 
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discrimination by agricultural internet sites relatively easy. For example, larger farms may be 
able to use information on a larger scale and thus gain greater benefits. On the other hand, 
smaller farmers have less ability to process and utilize complex or raw technical information (see 
Just, Wolf, Wu and Zilberman) and may thus find convenient access to processed information 
more attractive.  
An Explicit Stylized Model 
Consider two sets of agents: farmers and agricultural input suppliers. Under constant returns to 
scale (CRTS), production on a single farm follows aY(x) where a is acreage, x is the per acre 
application rate of an input such as a particular pesticide, and Y(x) is yield per acre. (Profit-
maximizing use of other inputs at given prices is implicit in Y(x) as a function of x). Suppose p is 
a competitive output price faced by all farms, w is the input price, and a quasi-fixed setup cost 
pi
∗
 is incurred if the input is used. Set-up costs are due to additional machinery requirements, 
search costs for custom applicators, and cleaning and maintenance of required equipment. 
 Incremental profit from using the input is π ≡ a[py(x) – wx] – pi
∗
 if the input is used, and 
zero otherwise, where y(x) ≡ Y(x) – Y(0), y′(x) > 0 and y″(x) ≤ 0. Under CRTS, each farmer either 
applies the input to the entire farm or acreage of a relevant crop or does not use the input. With 
positive use of the input, short-run profit maximization (given farmsize) yields first-order 
condition y′(x) = w/p solved by x* = x(w) > 0 with x′(w) ≤ 0. The short-run incremental profit 
function is 
*
( ) max{ ( ) ,0}a w a wpi pi pi pi= , ≡ −  where ( ) ( )w py x wxpi ∗ ∗≡ −  and '( ) ( ) 0w x wpi = − <  
by the envelope theorem. Thus, among all farms facing the same input price, the application rate 
is constant and profit varies linearly with farmsize. Farms facing a lower input price have higher 
per acre profit and higher yield due to a higher application rate.  
 Suppose the distribution of farmsize a (which may represent acreage of the relevant crop) 









a dF a∫  gives the total acreage in farms with 1 20 a a a a≤ < < ≤  where a  is the maximum 
farmsize. Suppose the agricultural input is produced and supplied by a profit maximizing 
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industry in storefronts, but that each input supplier can also sell on the internet by providing an 
internet site. Suppliers set storefront price w0 if no internet site is offered, or storefront price w1 
and internet price w2 if an internet site is offered (wi > 0). For notational efficiency, let 
( ),i ix x w≡  ' '( ),i ix x w≡  '' ''( ),i ix x w≡  and ( )i iwpi pi≡  so farm profit is ,  0,1,2.ia ipi pi∗− =  
 With an internet site, a farmer who chooses to not surf and buy necessarily pays price w1 
because buying on the internet is precluded by the choice to not surf. Koch and Cebula, 
Brynjolfsson and Smith, and Bailey have shown that prices per physical unit are not always 
lower on the internet than in storefronts. Thus, we consider two types of equilibrium. First, we 
consider an informed Nash equilibrium where surfing farmers observe both storefront and 
internet prices and maximize profits by choosing the lower of the two prices. Thus, the internet 
price cannot be higher than in storefronts, w2 ≤ w1. Second, we consider a myopic or uninformed 
equilibrium where the price difference is not perceived, so the internet price may be higher.  
 The benefit from extraneous information is assumed separable from WTP for the physical 
input, but correlated with characteristics of farmers, represented here by farmsize. Let the 
monetary value of benefits received by a farmer with acreage a from extraneous information be 
given by ( )aφ  if the farmer chooses to surf and 0 if not. Two stylized cases of this relationship 
are considered. A unique feature of information (e.g., technical know-how) is that, once acquired 
by a farmer, the information may be utilized on the entire farm or acreage of a crop with no 
additional information cost. Accordingly, one stylized case reflects “increasing scale benefits” 
where farmers with larger scale reap greater extraneous information benefits. 
 However, some extraneous information benefits are not positively related to scale (e.g., 
information extraneous to the crop on which the input is used or information about how to lower 
a fixed cost). Also, the opportunity cost of acquiring or processing information may differ among 
farms. For example, (i) operators of larger farms may have higher opportunity costs because of 
binding family labor constraints that are exacerbated by junk email and other transactions costs 
imposed by internet transactions, (ii) farms with larger acreages using the input in question may 
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have smaller acreages of other crops for which the extraneous information is useful, (iii) weather 
information that permits optimal timing of operations may be less useful on large farms that 
require more time for coverage, (iv) older farmers who have acquired more land may have less 
knowledge of how to use the internet, and/or (v) large (industrial) farms may have their own 
information processing capabilities and thus benefit less than small farms from highly processed 
information typically provided by broad-based agricultural internet sites. For simplicity of 
terminology, we refer to all these possibilities as “increasing opportunity costs.” 
 Depending on which effect dominates, the two stylized cases are defined as follows:  
Increasing Scale Benefits (ISB). If the increase in scale benefits dominates the increase in 
opportunity cost, then ' 0φ >  and (0) 0φ φ
∗
≡ <  where ˆ( ) 0aφ =  for some ˆ (0 )a a∈ , .  
Increasing Opportunity Costs ( IOC ). If the increase in opportunity costs dominates the 
increase in scale benefits, then ' 0φ <  and 0φ
∗
>  where ˆ( ) 0aφ =  for some ˆ (0 )a a∈ , .  
Alternative cases where ( ' 0 0)φ φ
∗
> , > , ( ' 0 0)φ φ
∗
< , < , or ' 0,φ ≡  or where ˆ( ) 0aφ =  does not 
occur for ˆ (0 )a a∈ ,  are uninteresting because they do not generate mixed internet behavior 
where some farmers surf and some do not (see below). To avoid tedious discussion, we assume 
that φ  is linear ( '' 0φ = ), although extension to nonlinearity is straightforward, and that 1' ,φ pi<  
which implies that the primary market is for the physical input rather than the extraneous 
information offered on internet sites that sell the input.  
 If an internet site is provided, a farmer with acreage a maximizes profit including the 
benefit of extraneous information ( )aφ  by choosing the largest net incremental benefit among 
four options (consistent with individual rationality and incentive compatibility):  
• SB: “Surf” the internet for extraneous information and “Buy” the physical good, receiving net 
incremental benefit 2( ) ( )SB a a api pi φ∗≡ − + .  
• SNB: “Surf” the internet for extraneous information and “Not Buy” the physical good, 
receiving net incremental benefit ( ) ( )SNB a aφ≡ .  
• NSB: “Not Surf” the internet for extraneous information and “Buy” the physical good, 
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receiving net incremental benefit 1( )NSB a api pi∗≡ − .  
• NSNB: “Not Surf” the internet for extraneous information and “Not Buy” the physical good, 
receiving net incremental benefit ( ) 0NSNB a ≡ .  
The agricultural supplier’s collection of personal information about farmers is reflected by 
farmers’ choices among these four internet behaviors. 
 Useful notation for indifference points between behavioral alternatives is given by:  
1 1a pi pi∗≡ /  where 1 1( ) ( ),NSNB a NSB a=  
2 2a pi pi∗≡ /  where 2 2( ) ( ),SNB a SB a=  
ˆ 'a φ φ
∗
≡ − /  where ˆ ˆ( ) ( ),NSNB a SNB a=  
1 2( ')a φ pi pi φ∗ ∗= / − −  where ( ) ( ),NSB a SB a∗ ∗=  
2( ) ( ')a pi φ pi φ+ ∗ ∗= − / +  where ( ) ( ).NSNB a SB a+ +=  
 To examine input supplier behavior, suppose manufacturing and selling has constant 
marginal cost function '.c 1 If internet sites are provided, the maximum aggregate short-run profit 






R A R A nK
,
Π = + − , 
subject to w2 ≤ w1 where ( ')i i iR w c x≡ −  is per acre supplier profit at price wi, assumed to be 
concave in wi, total acreage in each regime is ( )NSB
NSB
A a dF a= ∫  and ( ),SB SBA a dF a= ∫  n is the 
number of suppliers that provide internet sites, K is the cost of setting up an internet site 
(assumed to be independent of sales volume), and integration over NSB applies where NSB(a) > 
max{SB(a), SNB(a), NSNB(a)} and SB applies where SB(a) > max{NSB(a), SNB(a), NSNB(a)}. 
 If no internet site is provided, then farmers’ choices are limited to “Buy” (denoted by B), 
which is chosen if 0 0,api pi∗− >  or “Not Buy” (denoted by NB) otherwise. Thus, the maximum 











A a dF a= ∫  and 0 0.a pi pi∗≡ /  
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Characterizing Equilibria and Welfare 
This section examines how competitive profit-maximizing farms divide into behavioral regimes 
according to farmsize. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how different groups of farmers may be attracted 
to different behaviors simultaneously in both ISB and IOC cases. The horizontal axis represents 
farmsize and the vertical axis measures incremental benefits associated with farmers’ decisions 
to surf and/or buy. For NSNB, incremental benefits are zero along the horizontal axis. For SNB, 
incremental benefits follow ( ),aφ  which is increasing from a negative intercept in the ISB case 
of Figure 1, and decreasing from a positive intercept in the IOC case of Figure 2. For NSB, 
incremental benefits follow 1 ,api pi∗−  and are increasing in acreage (NSB′ = π1 > 0 where primes 
on behavioral functions represent differentiation with respect to a) from a negative intercept, 
pi
∗
− , assuming the storefront price is not so high that no farm would choose to buy. For SB, 
incremental benefits follow 2 ( )a api pi φ∗− + , which is increasing in acreage because w2 ≤ w1 and 
1' .φ pi<  The SB intercept is negative in the ISB case (Figure 1) because 0pi∗ >  and 0.φ∗ <  
 Conceptually, market behavior of profit-maximizing farmers follows the upper envelope 
of these four incremental benefit functions (shown in bold in Figures 1 and 2). As in Figure 2, 
depending on parameters and prices, all four behaviors can occur simultaneously in an IOC 
equilibrium. Throughout this paper, we regard market equilibria that do not include both NSB 
and SB behavior as uninteresting because, as shown below, input suppliers find provision of 
informative internet marketing sites unprofitable unless both types of sales occur.  
Proposition 1. Under ISB and informed Nash equilibrium, if prices induce both storefront and 
internet sales, then competitive profit-maximizing farms divide into behavioral regimes by 
farmsize with NSNB behavior for 10 ,a a< <  NSB behavior for 1 ,a a a∗< <  and SB behavior for 
,a a a
∗
< <  in which case aggregate net benefits for farmers are  
(3) 
1
1 2( ) ( ) [ ( )] ( )
a aI
a a
S a dF a a a dF api pi pi pi φ∗
∗
∗ ∗
= − + − + .∫ ∫  
Proof: Nonzero storefront (internet) sales implies 1a a≤  2( ),a a≤  while ai > 0 follows from 
0pi
∗
>  and 0,  1, 2.i ipi > =  Also, 2 1 0pi pi≥ >  and ' 0φ >  (under ISB) implies both SB′ > NSB′ > 
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NSNB′ and SB′ > SNB′ > NSNB′. With ISB, both NSB and SNB cannot exist in the same 
equilibrium. That is, if NSNB(a) < SNB(a), i.e., ( ) 0aφ > , for some acreage a, then SB(a) > 
NSB(a), i.e., 2 1( ) ,a a api pi φ pi pi∗ ∗− + > −  because 2 1.pi pi≥  Thus, because SNB′ > NSNB′, NSB 
cannot be the dominant behavior if SNB is the dominant behavior for some smaller farm size. 
Similarly, if NSNB(a) < NSB(a), i.e., 1 0api pi∗− > , for some acreage a, then 
2 ( ) ( )a a api pi φ φ∗− + >  so SB(a) > SNB(a). Thus, because SB′ > SNB′, SNB cannot be the 
dominant behavior if NSB is the dominant behavior for a smaller farm size. If both SB and NSB 
behavior occurs (as required by the proposition), then SNB does not occur, NSNB occurs because 
10 ,a a< ≤  and the ordering of behavior by farmsize must be as in the proposition because SB′ > 
NSB′ > NSNB′. 
 Excluding the uninteresting case where w1 is so high that no farmer chooses to buy at 
storefronts, market equilibrium must appear as in Figure 1. The equilibrium including SNB 
(where NSNB dominates for ˆ0 ,a a< <  SNB dominates for 2ˆ ,a a a< <  and SB dominates for 
2 )a a a< <  has w1 too high for storefront sales to occur. Likewise, the case where SB dominates 
NSB for farmsizes with NSB > 0 and dominates SNB for farmsizes with SNB > 0 is uninteresting. 
Proposition 2. Under IOC and informed Nash equilibrium, if prices induce both storefront and 
internet sales, then competitive profit-maximizing farms divide into behavioral regimes by 
farmsize with either (a) SNB behavior for ˆ0 ,a a< <  NSNB behavior for ˆ ,a a a+< <  SB behavior 
for ,a a a+ ∗< <  and NSB behavior for a a a∗ < <  if 2;a a+ >  or (b) with SNB behavior for 
20 ,a a< <  SB behavior for 2 ,a a a∗< <  and NSB behavior for a a a∗ < <  if 2.a a+ <  Thus, 




2 10 max( )
( ) ( ) [ ( )] ( ) ( ) ( )a a a aI
a a a





= + − + + −∫ ∫ ∫ . 
Proof: For the IOC case, ' 0φ <  and 1 0pi >  implies SNB′ < NSNB′ < NSB′. Also, SNB′ < SB′ 
because 2 0,pi >  and NSNB′ < SB′ follows from 1'φ pi| |<  because w2 ≤ w1 implies π1 ≤ π2, i.e., 
2 ' 0.pi φ+ >  Thus, (i) SNB′ < NSNB′ < SB′ < NSB′ if 1 2 'pi pi φ> +  (the case of Figure 2), or (ii) 
SNB′ < NSNB′ < NSB′ < SB′ if 1 2 'pi pi φ≤ +  (not shown). Under the latter condition, storefront 
 10 
sales do not occur (with linear )φ  because SB dominates NSB for all farm sizes if SB(0) > 
NSB(0).2 The proposition follows depending on whether NSNB behavior occurs. 
 Comparable to (3) or (4), aggregate farmer net benefits with no internet site are  
(5) 
0
0( ) ( )
aNI
a
S a dF api pi
∗
= − .∫  
Comparison of (5) to (3) or (4) requires solving for endogenous prices, w0, w1, and w2.  
Market Failure with Competition 
Before considering possible price discrimination, examination of a benchmark case with many 
(competitive) input suppliers is useful. Comparison to this case makes clear that the profit motive 
for provision of extraneous information is internet price discrimination, which eliminates some 
cases of market failure associated with information that occur under competition. 
Proposition 3. Input suppliers cannot recover the fixed cost of providing extraneous information 
on internet sales sites under competitive input pricing. Thus, such sites are not provided in the 
long run under competition if the fixed cost is positive. Market failure occurs depending on 
whether the incremental benefits for farmers exceed the fixed cost of providing a single site. 
Proof: In the many-input-supplier case, competitive pricing causes input supply prices to be bid 
down to the point of marginal cost pricing, w1 = w2 = 'c  if an internet site is provided and w0 = 
'c  if not. Aggregate sales and short-run profit are thus the same whether or not internet sites are 
offered while costs are higher by nK (by K for each supplier) when internet sites are provided. 
Thus, input suppliers maximize long-run profits by not providing such sites, even if SISB – SNI (or 
SIOC – SNI) is greater than the cost of providing a site at w1 = w2 = 'c .  
 As is typical considering the public good nature of information, competitive input 
suppliers have no incentive to provide information because sales and price are the same either 
way. A farmer can gain extraneous information by surfing available internet sites and then 
buying at the lowest internet or storefront price regardless of whether extraneous information is 
provided there. Unless some alternative source offers the same extraneous information (and ease 
of access), a market failure occurs suggesting the need for public intervention. 
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 This market failure result depends on uniqueness and convenience of the information 
offered by internet marketing sites. While public (e.g., USDA and EPA) internet sites offer 
information useful for assessing program participation requirements and benefits, their price and 
market information tends to be historical or updated infrequently (not sufficiently processed or 
updated to support daily production and marketing decisions). By comparison, sites such as 
DirectAg.com and PowerFarm.com offer readily accessible links to timely commodity price and 
weather information of general interest for farmers. Such information may fill a unique role. 
 These results suggest a possible prisoner’s dilemma whereby a firm not offering an 
internet site may lose sales during a transition to the internet but yet, after prices adjust, no firm 
may be able to recover the cost of providing an internet site. This may explain, in part, the 
dot.com bust where internet businesses with less product differentiation failed.3  
Potential Welfare Gains with Monopoly 
Consider alternatively the case of a single input supplier as a polar example of concentrated input 
supply. Concentration has greatly increased in agricultural input supply through mergers and 
bankruptcies nationally, and through declining farm population and rural commerce at the local 
level. For example, through concentration of agricultural machinery manufacturing, only one or 
two machinery companies may compete in many localities. Similarly, the pesticide industry that 
had 60-70 well-known manufacturers in the 1960s has been concentrated into fewer than ten 
major worldwide pesticide manufacturers. Furthermore, most individual pesticide markets, e.g., 
for post-emergent grass control in corn, involve no more than a few of these. Additionally, 
patents allow legal monopolization of specific agricultural input markets (e.g., brand name 
pesticides) and the adoption of herbicide-ready plants has increased pesticide specialization.  
 Consider first as a benchmark the behavior of a single input supplier when no internet site 
is provided. For the interesting case of an internal solution with 00 ,a a< <  the no-internet input 
supplier problem in (2) has first-order condition4  
(6) 0 0 0 0' 0,NI B BR A R AΠ = + =  
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where subscript i of Π, R, and A denotes differentiation with respect to wi, e.g., 
' ( ') 'i i i iR x w c x= + −  and 0 0 0 0BA x Z= − <  where 3 *( ) / 0,  0,1, 2.i i iZ dF a a ipi= > =  Equation (6) is 
the classical monopoly condition that equates marginal revenue and marginal cost. The first 
right-hand term can be written as 0 0 0 0' ( ') 'B B BR A x A w c x A= + −  where 0 Bx A  is the marginal profit 
on existing sales, 0 0( ') ' Bw c x A−  is the profit reduction from a reduction in application rate, and 
the remaining term, 0 0 ,BR A  is the profit reduction from a reduction in acreage on which the input 
is used, each associated with a small unit increase in price w0. Monopolistic pricing with 
downward sloping aggregate demand is caused by the 0 Bx A  term. In its absence, (6) is satisfied 
by competitive pricing at 0 '.w c=  The latter term of (6) must be negative because 0 0BA <  (the 
supplier is better off shutting down than choosing a price less than marginal cost). 
 Viewing as uninteresting the cases where price is set so high that the market disappears 
0( )a a≥  or so low that all farms use the input 0( 0),a ≤  we consider only an internal solution 
where 00 .a a< <  The second-order condition, 00 0 0 0 0 00'' 2 ' 0,NI B B BR A R A R AΠ = + + <  can 
conceivably fail, but failure corresponds to uninteresting cases without an internal solution. 
Failure cannot occur if AB is concave in w0 (because 0 BR A  is concave if R0 and AB are concave). 
Pricing Behavior and Supplier Profits with Increasing Scale Benefits. If an internet site is 
provided in the ISB case, the single-supplier problem is given by (1) subject to w2 ≤ w1 and 
10 a a a∗< ≤ <  (where n = 1). The latter constraint limits consideration to the interesting case of 
observed mixed behavior. Any w1 such that 1a a∗>  is too high for NSB to occur, any w2 such that 
a a
∗
≥  is too high for SB to occur, and any w1 such that a1 ≤ 0 is too low for NSNB to occur. 
First-order conditions for an internal solution  are 
(8) 1 1 1 1 2 1' 0,NSB NSB SBI R A R A R AΠ = + + =  









A a dF a= ∫   1 1 1 * 1 0,
NSBA Z x Z x= − + <  1 * 1 0,
SBA Z x= − >  
2 2 * 2 0,
SB NSBA A Z x= − = <  and 3
*
( ) 0.Z dF a a φ
∗ ∗ ∗
= / <  The first two terms in (8) have an 
interpretation similar to (6) while the latter term represents the increase in profit as upper 
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marginal acreage moves from NSB to SB behavior with an increase in w1. This term does not 
occur in (6) because farmsize is bounded by .a  The interpretation of (9) is symmetric to (8) and 
similar to (6) except that a
∗
 replaces a1 as the lower bound of the relevant behavioral regime, 
and the latter term is modified because the marginal acreage that exits the SB regime does not 
cease to use the input but rather earns alternative per acre profit R1. As in the no-internet 
problem, second-order conditions can fail but only in uninteresting cases where an internal 
solution does not apply. Failure cannot occur if both ANSB and ASB are concave in w1 and w2.5 
Proposition 4. Under ISB and informed Nash equilibrium, a monopolistic input supplier will 
choose not to offer an internet sales site with extraneous information because it offers no 
possibilities for price discrimination. 
Proof: Consider the Lagrangian, 
(10) 1 2 1 2( ),NSB SBL R A R A nK w wλ= + − + − − ∆  
which has first-order conditions 1 0I λΠ + =  and 2 0.I λΠ − =  Let bars denote evaluation at 
1 2 0w w w= =  where 0w  solves (6), and let tildes denote evaluation at prices 1 1w w= ɶ  and 2 2w w= ɶ  
that solve (8) and (9), e.g., 0 0NIΠ =  and 1 2 0.I IΠ = Π =ɶ ɶ  Then the solution of (10) at 0∆ =  satisfies 
1 2 0 0.NII IΠ + Π = Π =  The relationship of the no-internet and internet cases can thus be examined 
by imposing the constraint 1 2w w− = ∆  and varying ∆ from 0∆ =  to 1 2.w w∆ = −ɶ ɶ ɶ  Differentiating 
the constraint implies * *1 2/ / 1dw d dw d∆ − ∆ =  where asterisks denote the optimum of (10). Thus, 
* * * * * * * * * *
1 1 2 2 1 2/ / / / ( / 1) .d d dw d dw d dw d dw dλ λ λΠ ∆ = Π ∆ + Π ∆ = − ∆ + ∆ − = −  By LeChatelier’s 
Principle, *λ  is a monotonic function of ∆ such that * 0λ →  as ∆ → ∆ɶ  because ∆ɶ  is the point 
where the constraint coincides with the unconstrained optimum. Thus, if 1 2 ( ) 0I I λΠ = −Π = − < >  
at ∆ = 0 (the no-internet optimum) then Π* is decreasing (increasing) in ∆, so the unconstrained 
optimum must satisfy 1 2 ( ) 0.w w∆ = − < >ɶ ɶ  Thus, imposing 1 2 0w w− = ∆ ≥  (Nash equilibrium) in 
maximizing (1), Kuhn-Tucker conditions imply that prices will be set at optimal unconstrained 
prices such that 1 2 0w w− >ɶ ɶ  if 1 2 0,I IΠ = −Π >  and otherwise at 1 2 0w w w= =  if 1 2 0w w− ≤ɶ ɶ  or, 
equivalently, if 1 2 0.I IΠ = −Π <  Evaluating (8) at 1 2 0w w w= =  where 1 2 0R R R= =  yields 
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1 0 0 0' ,
NSBI BR A R AΠ = +  which by comparison to (6) at the no-internet optimum, 
0 0 0 0' 0,NI B BR A R AΠ = + =  implies that 1 0IΠ <  because NSB NSB SBBA A A A< = +  and 
0 1 1 .
NSB SBBA A A= +  Thus, the constraint 1 2 0w w− = ∆ ≥  is binding so both prices are set at the 
optimal no-internet price under ISB. Because ,NII KΠ = Π −  the supplier is better off avoiding 
fixed cost K and not offering an internet sales site (sales and other costs are the same either way). 
Proposition 4 implies that either the input supplier must undertake some action that 
requires users of its extraneous information to make purchases at a higher internet price, or price 
discrimination does not increase profit. Without price discrimination, the input supplier has no 
way to recover the fixed cost of providing an informative site (excluding the case of product 
promotion information). In Figure 1, the higher benefits for farmers with an informative internet 
site are represented by the cross-hatched area. If 1 2 0w w w= =  then ˆa a∗ =  so the cross-hatched 
area is simply the shaded area below SNB. Farmers following SB behavior receive benefits from 
an internet site while farmers who follow NSB behavior either way are unaffected. Failure to 
provide the internet site is a market failure if the incremental farmer benefits exceed the cost K of 
providing the site (assuming the information is not available elsewhere with the same 
convenience—a necessary condition for the site to be preferred in the first place).  
 To consider briefly the case where an input supplier tries to charge a higher price for 
internet sales than storefront sales, if internet sales are limited to those who pay a fixed 
membership fee, then the effect is equivalent to increasing the negativity of φ
∗
 by the amount of 
the membership fee. Thus, farmers may surf to receive the extraneous information but they 
would buy the input at the lower storefront price if w1 < w2. Selling information by membership 
fee on the internet would then operate as a profit making activity independent of input sales. If a 
minimum sales quantity were required to access the internet information, the price increment for 
internet sales multiplied by the minimum sale quantity would be equivalent to a membership fee 
so that all other purchases would occur at storefronts. The only way the input supplier can charge 
a higher price on the internet in an informed Nash equilibrium is by offering information that has 
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a value proportional to the amount of sales, which is the case of product promotion information. 
Pricing Behavior and Supplier Profits with Increasing Opportunity Cost. For the IOC case, 
the single-supplier problem is given by (1) subject to w2 ≤ w1 and 20 max( )a a a a+ ∗< , ≤ <  
(where n = 1). The latter constraint limits consideration to the interesting IOC case where both 
storefront and internet sales occur. Any w2 such that 2max( )a a a+ ∗, >  implies that w2 is so high 
that SB cannot occur, and any w1 such that a a∗ ≥  implies that w1 is so high that NSB cannot 









A a dF a
+
= ∫  1 1 1 * 0,
NSB SBA A x Z= − = − <  and 2 2 2 *
SB NSBA A x Z< − = −  
0,<  because now 
*
0.Z >  Interpretations of (8) and (9) are similar although the roles reverse as 
large farms now buy from storefronts and small farms buy on the internet.  
Proposition 5. Under IOC and informed Nash equilibrium, a monopolistic input supplier will 
offer an internet sales site with extraneous information and set the internet price lower than the 
storefront price if the incremental profits from price discrimination more than cover the fixed 
cost of providing the site. 
Proof: The proof follows that of Proposition 4 except that evaluating (8) at 1 2 0w w w= =  yields 
1 0'
NSBI R AΠ =  because 1 1
NSB SBA A= −  and 1 2 0 ,R R R= =  which by comparison to (6) at the no-
internet optimum, 0 0 0 0' 0,NI B BR A R AΠ = + =  implies 1 0.IΠ >  That is, 0 0BA <  in 0NIΠ  implies 
0' 0,R >  which implies 1 0.IΠ >  Thus, the Nash equilibrium constraint, 1 2 0,w w− = ∆ ≥  is not 
binding in the IOC case. 
Proposition 6. Suppose per acre input demand generates concave per acre supplier profit under 
the conditions of Proposition 5. Then (a) the internet price will be lower than the no-internet 
storefront price and (b) the storefront price will be higher with an internet site than the no-
internet storefront price if the farmsize distribution is such that the density function is not 
declining sharply at acreage levels below that which use the input at the high price. 
Proof: (a) Let the arguments of AB, ANSB, and ASB be given explicitly following 
0
0( ) ( ),
aB
a
A w a dF a= ∫  
*
1
1 2( , ) ( ),
aNSB
a
A w w a dF a= ∫  and 
*
1 2( , ) ( ).
aSB
a
A w w a dF a= ∫  Evaluating the 
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no-internet acreage function at w2 instead of w0 given that w1 ≥ w2 in the IOC case reveals 
2 1 2 1 2( ) ( , ) ( , )B NSB SBA w A w w A w w= +  and 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 2( ) ( , ) ( , )B NSB SBA w A w w A w w= +  because all 
acreage for which input use is profitable at internet price w2 will use the input for w1 ≥ w2 when 
an internet site is provided. The no-internet first-order condition in (6) can thus be written as 
(11) 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 0' [ ( , ) ( , )] [ ( , ) ( , )] 0NI NSB SB NSB SBR A w w A w w R A w w A w wΠ = + + + =  
for any w1 ≥ w0. By comparison, the first-order conditions in (8) and (9) can be rewritten as 
(12) 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2' ( , ) ( ) ( , ) 0,NSB NSBI R A w w R R A w wΠ = + − =  
(13) 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2' ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0.SB NSB SBI R A w w R A w w R A w wΠ = + + =  
The difference between (11) and (13) where w0 = w2 is 
 
0 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
2 2 1 1 2 1 2
' ( , ) ( ) ( , )
               [ ' / ' / ] ( , ) 0
NI NSB NSBI
NSB
R A w w R R A w w
R x R x x A w w
Π − Π = + −
= − >
 
where the latter equality follows by substituting the implication of (12) because 
2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1( , ) / ( , ) / .NSB NSBA w w A w w x x= −  The sign follows because concavity of R implies 
2 2 1 1' / ' / 0R x R x− >  if w1 > w2. Positivity of 0 2
NI IΠ − Π  at the optimal 1 1w w= ɶ  implies that the 
optimal no-internet price 0w  must be greater than the 2 2w w= ɶ  that solves the internet problem 
because 0 0
NIΠ >  at 0 2w w= ɶ  where 2 0.
IΠ =  Thus, by second-order conditions of the no-internet 
problem, 0 0
NIΠ =  must occur at 0 2.w w> ɶ  (b) To see that 1 0 ,w w>ɶ  note that (8) and (9) imply 






A wR A R A
R A R A A w
= − − > −  






A wR A R A
R A R A A w
= − − > −  
respectively, where the latter inequalities follow from (6), which implies 0 0 0' / /B BR R A A= −  at 
0 ,w  and, hence, 0' ( ) ( ) 0B Bi i i iR A w R A w+ >  or, equivalently, 0' / ( ) / ( )B Bi i i iR R A w A w> −  at 0iw w<  
by the associated second-order condition. Equations (14) and (15) can be expressed as 
(16) 1 1 * 2 1 * 1 1
1 1
'
NSB NSB NSB SB
R x Z R x Z x Z








SB SB NSB SB
R x Z x Z R x Z x Z






respectively, where the latter inequality follows from 2 1( ) ( )NSB SBB BA w A A A w= + > . Thus, 
where /( ),NSB NSB SBA A Aθ = +  equations (16) and (17) imply 1 1 * 1 2 2 2( ) / .Z R Z R R Z Rθ< − <  
Because 1 2R R>  if 2 1 0 ,w w w< <  which follows because concavity of R implies 2 1 0' ' 'R R R> >  
and (6) implies 0' 0,R >  this condition cannot hold if 1 2.Z Z>  Where 3 *( ) ( ( )) ( ) /Z w dF a w a w pi=  
and 
*
( ) / ( ),a w wpi pi=  
(18) '( ( ))sign '( ) sign ( ) 3 .( ( ))






Thus, '( ) 0Z w >  for 2 1w w w< <  and 1 1 2 2( ) ( )Z Z w Z Z w= > =  as long as w2 < w1 and the density 
function is not declining so sharply at acreages a(w) for w ≤ w1 that (18) becomes negative.  
 The density condition in (18) is typical of the mechanism design literature because erratic 
distribution functions can cause almost any qualitative result. Intuitively, price discrimination 
benefits for input suppliers are possible for two reasons. First, the higher storefront price applies 
to farmers unwilling to bear the opportunity costs of the internet who would buy the input either 
way. Profits earned from this group increase because the price increases without reducing the 
acreage on which the input is applied (although the application rate decreases marginally). 
Second, the lower internet price permits additional sales to farmers willing to bear the 
opportunity costs of the internet who would not otherwise find use of the input profitable. 
 Comparing to the case of no internet in Figure 2, the return to input use with no internet 
follows a broken line with the same intercept as NSB but rotated counter-clockwise to 0( )NSB w  
because the storefront price is higher with an internet site.  Compared to the case with no internet 
site, (i) farms with the largest farmsizes, ,a a a
∗
< <  are worse off because they pay a higher 
price w1 than 0w  while applying the input to the same acreage, (ii) farms with intermediate 
farmsizes, 0 ,a a a∗< <  are better off because they receive a lower internet price w2 than 0w  while 
applying the input on the same acreage, in addition to receiving benefits from information, (iii) 
farms with smaller farmsizes, 0 ,a a a+ < <  gain byusing the input on acreage where it would not 
otherwise be profitable, in addition to receiving benefits from information, and (iv) farms with 
the smallest farmsizes, ˆ0 ,a a< <  reap a windfall gain from free information on the internet 
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without buying the input. The windfall gain of the smallest farms is represented by the cross-
hatched area below SNB. The shaded area represents the loss to farmers who would buy the input 
in absence of the internet site. The cross-hatched area under SB, which partially overlaps the 
shaded area, represents the additional gains from offering the lower internet price plus the value 
of information received by those who use the input.  
 Market failure can also occur in the IOC case. The supplier receives incremental price 
discrimination profits from farms with sizes 0a a a+ < <  that would not otherwise be customers, 
as well as from farms with sizes a a a
∗
< <  that pay a higher price than without an internet. 
However, the input supplier receives no return from the smallest farms who receive the windfall 
gain, and less profit than without an internet from farms with sizes 0 .a a a∗< <  Thus, private 
profits from providing an internet site may not be sufficient to offset the fixed cost of providing 
it even though aggregate social welfare is improved thereby. Further, provision of the internet 
site is not necessarily preferred if an input supplier chooses to provide it. Because the input 
supplier charges a higher price to large farms, their per acre use of the input declines (a standard 
monopoly pricing result). The deadweight loss of this higher price to large farms may or may not 
be made up by the additional social benefits to those groups who gain when an internet is 
provided. Social preferences depend on the farmsize distribution and magnitude of fixed costs. 
These results extend those found elsewhere whereby the internet may or may not increase 
aggregate economic surplus. For example, third-degree price discrimination has been shown to 
increase welfare if total output increases (Hausman and MacKie-Mason) or if transactions take 
place that would not otherwise occur (Deneckere and McAfee). 
 For the case where 0 ˆa a<  (not shown in Figure 2), the distributional implications are 
mathematically the same where both aˆ  and a
∗
 are replaced by a2. Thus, the largest farms are 
worse off, small farms receive a windfall gain, and some midsize farms are able to afford use of 
the input at a profit that would not otherwise be possible. In both cases, the ability to achieve 
price discrimination through internet sales has nontrivial distributional implications. 
 19 
Characteristics of Information Provided by Internet Marketing Sites. The informed Nash 
equilibrium results show that provision of extraneous information on internet sales sites depends 
on whether the associated fixed costs can be recovered through price discrimination. The results 
thus determine what types of extraneous information will be provided by internet marketing. 
Proposition 7. With informed Nash equilibrium, internet marketing sites will not provide 
information that has benefits positively correlated with the WTP of farmers for the product 
offered for sale, nor will they provide extraneous information that benefits all farms. 
Proof: Propositions 4 and 5 shows that the correlation of extraneous information benefits with 
farmers’ WTP for the physical input must be negative to facilitate effective price discrimination. 
Extraneous information with either positive benefits for all customers ( ' 0 0)φ φ
∗
> , >  or negative 
benefits for all customers ( ' 0 0)φ φ
∗
< , <  does not facilitate price discrimination (thus ruling out 
cases with ˆ 0).a <  Similarly, price discrimination incentives vanish when ˆ ,a a>  because all 
sales occur on the internet (at storefronts) if 0φ
∗
>  ( 0).φ
∗
<  
Proposition 7 explains why internet marketing sites choose to offer extraneous 
information that does not have a direct relationship with the products offered for sale. The 
optimal degree of price discrimination (the difference in w1 and w2) and the ability to recover 
fixed costs depends on the strength of negativity of the correlation of information benefits with 
WTP. For example, in both Figures 1 and 2, if SNB is relatively flat and thus near the horizontal 
axis, then SB ≐  NSB. Therefore, the incremental profits from price discrimination will be small 
and less likely to cover the fixed cost of providing an informative internet site. 
While market failure is typical for dissemination of information because of its public 
good nature, a significant contribution of the internet implied by these results is that private 
provision of information is induced by price discrimination possibilities. But this is true for only 
for a very specific type of information. Failure to provide information that has positive benefits 
for all farmers is a market failure that is not resolved by the internet. 
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Privacy and Naivety on the Internet 
While early users tended to be naive about how personal information could be collected and used 
by internet sites, privacy concerns have been increasing. As users have become less myopic, 
many businesses have posted policies about sharing personal information. But few individuals 
read such policies, the policies are often vague and difficult to enforce, and firms often retain the 
option of sharing data with firms within a corporate structure that do not have the same policies, 
or of sharing data with firms for which links are provided on the site. Further, when faced with 
failure, many firms have cut losses by selling customer data (Rosencrance). 
 Due to privacy concerns, some internet users are increasingly reluctant to provide 
personal information, e.g., through registration, and expend more effort to investigate alternative 
prices.6 To understand the implications of increasing awareness of this reverse information flow, 
this section examines myopic or uninformed equilibrium, which might represent internet 
marketing prior to Nash equilibrium. Suppose myopic farmers are unaware of the reverse flow of 
personal information and the associated price differences associated with surfing behavior. That 
is, suppose farmers buy or not buy based only on the price revealed by the choice to surf or not. 
Thus, in the ISB (IOC) case, farmers with farmsizes larger (smaller) than aˆ  surf the web and 
others do not. The supplier can thus monopolize the two groups independently.  






( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a a a aI
a a a a
S a dF a a dF a a a dF api pi φ pi pi φ,
∗ ∗
,
= − + + − + .∫ ∫ ∫   
Substituting limits of integration into (1), the constraints for an internal solution involving both 
internet and storefront sales are 1 ˆ0 a a< <  and 2 .a a<  No farm would buy at the storefront 
(internet) price if 1 ˆa a≥  2( ).a a≥  Neither constraint is binding unless costs are so high that 
1 2' ,c w w>  for all 1 ˆa a<  and 2 .a a<  The first-order conditions in (8) and (9) become 
(19) 1 1 1 1' 0,NSB NSBI R A R AΠ = + =  





A a dF a= ∫  
2 ˆmax( , )
( ),aSB
a a
A a dF a= ∫  1 1 1 0NSBA x Z= − <  1 2 0,SB NSBA A= =  and 
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2 2 2 0SBA x Z= − <  if 2 ˆa a>  and 2 0SBA =  if 2 ˆ.a a<  Conditions (19) and (20) are identical in form 
to the no-internet case of (6) where the upper limit of farmsize distribution is aˆ  for (19) and a  
for (20). Second-order conditions hold in similar circumstances. 
Proposition 8. Under ISB and myopic behavior: (a) If all farms that buy the input in absence of 
an internet site prefer surfing, then a monopolistic input supplier who offers an internet sales site 
with extraneous information will set the internet price the same as would exist in storefronts in 
absence of the internet, and set a lower storefront price. The site will be offered if profit from 
selling in storefronts at the lower price is sufficient to cover the fixed cost of providing the site. 
(b) Otherwise, a monopolist input supplier who offers such an internet site will charge a higher 
internet price and a lower storefront price than the storefront price in absence of an internet. (c) 
In either case, the incentive from price discrimination can be insufficient to offer the site even 
when provision of the site is socially preferred. 
Proof: Consider the two alternatives, 0 ˆa a>  and 0 ˆ,a a<  to compare pricing behavior with and 
without an internet site. (a) If 0 ˆ,a a>  then (20) is an identical condition on w2 as (6) is on w0 and 
yields the same price, 2 0.w w=  So profit on sales to large farms (with 0 )a a a< <  is identical to 
profit from all farms in the no-internet case. But the input supplier can make additional profit by 
selling to small farms (with 1 ˆ)a a a< <  if a lower storefront price, w1, satisfies 0 1w w c> >  and 
1 ˆ.a a<  If this additional profit is more than the fixed cost of providing the internet site, then the 
input supplier will provide the site. (b) If 0 ˆ,a a<  then midsize farms that buy at storefronts 
without an internet site (with 0 ˆ)a a a< <  will choose not to surf. Evaluating (20) at 2 0w w=  
yields 2 2' ,SBI R AΠ =  which by comparison to (6) at the no-internet optimum, 
2
0 0 0 0' 0,NI BR A x ZΠ = − =  implies that 2 0IΠ >  because 20 0 0.x Z >  Positivity and negative 
monotonicity (by second-order conditions) of (20) at 2 0w w=  imply that w2 must be increased 
from 0w  to satisfy (20). Evaluating (19) at 1 0w w=  yields 21 1 1 1' 0NI NSBR A x ZΠ = − =  compared to 
(6) at the no-internet optimum. At 1 0 ,w w=  the second term is identical to (6) while the first term 
is proportionally less (because ),NSB BA A<  implying negativity of (19). Negativity and negative 
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monotonicity (by second-order conditions) of (19) imply that w1 must be reduced from 0w  to 
satisfy (19). (c) In either case, the internet site will provide a windfall gain to those who follow 
SNB behavior (farmsizes 2ˆ )a a a< <  but do not add profit opportunities for the input supplier. 
Thus, depending on the farmsize distribution, the input supplier may not have a sufficient profit 
incentive even though provision of the internet site is socially preferable. 
Likely, w2 will be increased at least to the point where 2 ˆa a≥  because choosing a lower 
w2 would not increase the acreage on which the input is used. If so, farmers with farmsizes at aˆ  
(or slightly larger) will receive zero (or near zero) incremental profits compared to substantially 
positive profits in the case without an internet site (where all farms with sizes above 0a  receive 
positive incremental profits that increase in a). So at least the smallest farms that choose to surf 
(with ˆ)a a>  are worse off when an internet site is provided under myopia. Midsize farms (with 
0 ˆ)a a a< <  that would buy at storefronts if an internet site were not provided are better off 
because they receive a lower storefront price. Smaller farms (with 1 0 )a a a< <  are better off both 
because they can profitably use the input only when the lower storefront price is provided (note 
that 1 0a a<  follows from 1 0 ).w w<  
The interesting contrast in the ISB results between myopic and informed equilibria is that 
opportunities for price discrimination are eliminated by eliminating myopia. Thus, price 
discrimination may be possible and profitable during the infancy of the internet with both types 
of information. However, providing information with benefits that are positively correlated with 
farmsize becomes unprofitable as myopia decreases. These results suggest an interesting 
hypothesis about the transformation in types of information provided at internet marketing sites.  





ˆ ˆ0 min( ) max( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a a a aI
a a a a
S a dF a a a dF a a dF aφ pi pi φ pi pi,
∗ ∗
, ,
= + − + + − .∫ ∫ ∫  
Substituting these limits of integration into (1), the relevant constraints for an internal solution 
that involves both internet and storefront sales are 2 ˆ0 a a< <  and 1 .a a<  No farm would buy at 
the internet price if 2 ˆ,a a≥  and no farm would buy at the storefront price if 1 .a a≥  Neither 
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constraint is binding unless costs are so high that 1 2' ,c w w>  for all 1a a<  and 2 ˆ.a a<  The first-








A a dF a= ∫  1 1 1 0NSBA x Z= − <  if 1 ˆa a>  and 1 0NSBA =  if 1 ˆ,a a<  
1 2 0,SB NSBA A= =  and 2 2 2 0.SBA x Z= − <  These conditions are parallel to the ISB case under myopic 
behavior with the role of NSB and SB (and associated prices) reversed. Thus, analogous 
interpretations and results follow.  
Proposition 9. Under IOC and myopic behavior: (a) If all firms that buy the input in absence of 
an internet prefer not surfing, then a monopolistic input supplier who offers an internet sales site 
with extraneous information will charge a lower internet price and the same storefront price as in 
the absence of an internet. The site will be offered if the profit from internet selling at a lower 
price is sufficient to cover the fixed cost of providing the site. (b) Otherwise, a monopolist input 
supplier who offers such an internet site will charge a lower internet price and a higher storefront 
price than the storefront price in absence of an internet. (c) In either case, the incentive from 
price discrimination can be insufficient even when provision of the site is socially preferred. 
 For the IOC case with 0 ˆ,a a<  larger farms (with ˆ )a a a< <  who choose not to surf are 
worse off when an internet site is provided because a higher price is charged at storefronts. But 
this group is larger than in the informed Nash equilibrium because farms with aˆ a a
∗
< <  enjoy a 
lower internet price and increased profit when informed (note that aˆ a
∗
<  follows in the IOC  
case from w2 < w1). Midsize farms (with 0 ˆ)a a a< <  that would buy at storefronts if an internet 
site were not provided are better off because they receive the lower internet price plus 
information. Smaller farms (with 2 0 )a a a< <  are better off both by receiving information and 
because they can profitably use the input only at the lower internet price (note that 2 0a a<  
follows from 2 0 ).w w<  Finally, the smallest farms (with 20 )a a< <  reap a windfall gain from 
free information without buying the input, even though they generate no profit for the input 
supplier. As with IOC and informed Nash equilibrium, two offsetting distortions affect whether 
the input supplier offers an internet site. Monopoly pricing to large farmers may make the input 
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supplier’s incremental profits larger than social gains (a distortion that affects more farmers in 
the myopic case), but windfall gains of free information to the smallest farmers may make social 
gains larger than the supplier’s incremental profit. 
 Some farmers can be better off and others worse off with myopic behavior. For example, 
farmers who pay a higher price on the internet because they fail to compare with the lower 
storefront price are worse off. But farmers with farmsizes below aˆ  are offered lower prices than 
with informed behavior. Interestingly, the additional profit for the supplier can also be less than 
when farmers are informed. For example, in Figure 2, myopia implies that no price 
discrimination among farmers with farmsizes greater than aˆ  is possible. They all choose not to 
surf and thus all face the same price w1. If the input supplier’s cost is such that 2 'w c=  yields 
2 ˆ,a a≥  then the input supplier cannot price discriminate and no internet site is offered. 
Notably, this case where the supplier is worse off with myopic farmers than informed 
farmers because price discrimination possibilities vanish is also a case where farmers are worse 
off. With myopia, farmers lose virtually all of the gains that are possible with an internet site in 
the informed case. Of course, this result arises only under IOC. With ISB, profit-enhancing price 
discrimination is not feasible with informed farmers so no internet site is provided. And supplier 
profits with myopic equilibrium must be higher than in the case with no internet because that 
outcome is among the ones over which the supplier optimizes.   
Conclusions 
We have investigated why internet sites provided by agricultural input suppliers offer extraneous 
information (not directly related to their products) such as current commodity price and weather 
information. Results generate equilibria with a mixture of internet behavior and non-trivial 
distributional implications for farmers depending on heterogeneity. In most cases, the benefits 
are biased toward smaller farms because they benefit from lower prices under price 
discrimination or because they receive windfall gains from free information without buying. 
Larger farms in most cases pay higher prices than without an internet. 
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 Input suppliers find providing extraneous information profitable only when it provides 
additional profits from third-degree price discrimination sufficient to cover the cost of providing 
an informative marketing site. When farmers are well informed about price differences between 
storefronts and the internet, only information that has benefits negatively correlated with WTP 
for the physical input among farmers permits such price discrimination. When farmers are 
uninformed about price differences (or choose to use or not use the internet based on its 
transactions costs, risk, and nuisance factors regardless of price), both positive and negative 
correlation of information benefits with farmers’ WTP permit price discrimination. A casual 
review of agricultural marketing sites reveals a rough correspondence to the implications of the 
model and explains why informative marketing sites do not focus heavily on promotional 
information related to the product offered for sale. 
 The results suggest two contributing explanations for the dot.com bust of 2000 and 2001 
in which internet site providers without a real-world presence failed, and why many successful 
sites have been acquired by established firms with differentiated products. First, competition bids 
down prices toward marginal cost, which leaves input suppliers without product differentiation 
unable to cover the fixed cost of an informative internet site. Second, the types of information 
that can be used profitably by suppliers narrows with decreasing myopia (internet experience). 
Another oft-cited reason is that consumers trust products of well-established firms, but trust and 
does not provide a reason why conventional goods are bundled with extraneous information.  
 Information generally has public good characteristics that lead to market failure. 
However, price discrimination made possible by informative internet marketing may provide 
sufficient profits to make its public provision privately profitable for input suppliers. A peculiar 
implication is that eliminating, say by legal means, the market failure associated with price 
discrimination can eliminate the possibility of private internet marketing to correct the public 
good market failure associated with information. But the profit incentive of suppliers may be 
either too strong (when price discrimination profits are primarily captured from farmers by 
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raising prices, thus reducing application rates) or too weak (because windfall gains for farmers 
from free information do not add to supplier profitability) to achieve an optimal social welfare.  
 Several important qualifications must be borne in mind in application of these results. 
Other motivations for providing informative internet sites besides price discrimination include 
product promotion, which enhances farmers WTP for the supplier’s products, and revenue from 
advertising products for other firms. Obviously, these explanations offer a viable explanation for 
providing information generally. But the product promotion explanation does not explain why 
suppliers provide extraneous information that is not positively related to customers’ WTP for the 
products offered for sale.  
 The model developed here offers several opportunities for useful generalizations. First, 
while heterogeneity is measured by farmsize here, the results have implications for modeling 
other dimensions of heterogeneity. Second, although internet behavior is modeled crudely here 
by including only a choice to surf or not surf and to buy or not buy the input, the same principles 
can be generalized to consider other linking choices observed by suppliers in farmers’ 
clickstream behavior. Expanding suppliers’ data mining possibilities in this way would make 
discernment of farmers WTP more accurate and permit greater price discrimination. Third, the 
model can be generalized to the case of several suppliers by solving for the optimal or 
equilibrium number of suppliers and then examining the extent of price discrimination 
possibilities. Fourth, the supplier’s choice of information characteristics can be endogenized so 
the supplier can choose a profit maximizing correlation of extraneous information benefits with 
WTP. Fifth, endogenizing both firm numbers and suppliers’ extraneous information choice can 
lead to a model of niche internet marketing that can determine the equilibrium number of internet 
niches and associated extraneous information characteristics that would not be offered by the 
private sector. Finally, the model could be generalized for the case where some (small?) farmers 
are myopic but other (large?) farmers are well informed. 
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Footnotes 
1 Constant cost merely simplifies notation. All results hold under a typical cost function ( )c ⋅  with 
standard properties, ' 0,  '' 0.c c> ≥  
2 Results thus far hold with nonlinear .φ  With nonlinearity of ,φ  both cases (i) and (ii) can occur 
in the same equilibrium, although any switching must be from the second case to the first as farm 
size increases if '' 0.φ ≤  Linearity of φ  is assumed to avoid the tedium of such switching cases. 
3
 Dewan, Jing and Seidmann (1999 and 2000) find a similar prisoner’s dilemma for price 
discrimination facilitated by customizing products based on personal information.  
4 Because 0 0 0,a w∂ /∂ >  an internal solution for a0 is highly likely. An input supplier cannot 
increase acreage that uses the input by reducing w0 below the point where a0 = 0, and input use 
and revenue would fall to zero by increasing w0 to the point where 0 .a a=  If a bounded solution 
with positive profit occurs, it is at a0 = 0 where all farmers use the input and w0 is chosen such 
that the per acre input demand elasticity is equal to the supplier’s inverse profit rate, 
0 0 0 0 0' / /( '),x w x w w c− = −  which is evident from evaluating (6) at a0 = 0. 
5
 To see that results hold with increasing marginal cost, note that (1) becomes 
1 2
1 1 2 2 1 2max ( ) ,I NSB SB NSB SB
w w
w x A w x A c x A x A nK
,
Π = + − + −  for which first-order conditions are 
exactly as in (8) and (9), and (2) becomes 
0
0 0 0max ( ),NI B B
w
w x A c x AΠ = −  for which the first-order 
condition is exactly as in (6). The second-order conditions are modified only by subtracting 
additional ''c  terms, which make second-order conditions more likely. For example, 0''( )Bc x A  is 
subtracted from the right-hand side of 00NIΠ  in the no-internet case. Thus, while constancy of 
marginal cost simplifies the notational presentation, it does not modify the results presented here. 
6
 However, few users protect themselves from cookies (small files placed on a user’s computer 
that allow internet sites to identify previous clickstream behavior). As of August 2000, the Pew 
Research Center reported that 86 percent of online users were concerned about privacy but only 
10 percent had disabled cookies. Fifty-six percent did not know what cookies are. 
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